[Ukrainian Statehood in the Twentieth Century: Historical and Political Analysis. Kyiv: Political Thought, 1996. pp. 193-205.]

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Ukraine in Rumanian Foreign-policy Concepts

Serhiy HRYHORYSHYN

At the turn of the twentieth century the foreign policy strategy of Rumania's ruling elite was based on the concept of uniting all "Rumanian historical provinces" into a "unitary Rumanian nation state," the Ukrainian lands of Northern Bukovyna and Southern Bessarabia being treated as part of this "Greater Rumania." Well-known Rumanian historians N. Iorga, C. Giurescu, A. Xenopol, I. Nistor et al. helped develop the concept of a "Greater Rumania." Their efforts were aimed at searching for ethnic, historical, and geographical reasons which would confirm Rumania's "right" to the whole territory of Bukovyna and Bessarabia. This idea was intensively propagated both inside and outside the country.

1. Rumanian Policy on Northern Bukovyna During World War I

The most authoritative official ideologist of the Kingdom of Rumania's "eastern policy" was Professor I. Nistor who motivated in his works the concept of Rumania's "historical right" to Pokuttya, Bessarabia, and all of Bukovyna, and first formulated in Rumanian historiography claims to so-called Transdnistria (between the Dnister and the South Bug).¹

When on August 1, 1914, the First World War began /194/ in Europe, it became clear that Rumania would not stay out. At that time the latter's relations with Austria-Hungary were strained to a breaking point due to their rivalry over Transylvania. Bucharest's appetites were not confined to territories mostly populated by Rumanians but, also extended to Hungarian, Serbian, and Ukrainian territories.

In early September 1916, after two years of political and diplomatic maneuvers and a gradual distancing from its former allies, the Central Powers, an agreement was signed in Bucharest on Rumania's entry into the war on the Entente side.

Rumania entered World War I in order to annex new territory and create a "Greater Rumania," with ethnically Ukrainian lands being the main target. Rumanian mass media of the period expended great effort to shape a corresponding public opinion and win over those political figures and intellectuals of Bukovyna who were oriented toward the Habsburg Empire. As early as November 1914 the Rumanian political figures of Bukovyna demanded that the King of Rumania not enter the war against Austria-Hungary, for it was Russia that presented the "main danger" for the Rumanian people "which could be defended only by a strong Austria."² They were loyal to the Austro-Hungarian Empire even when the latter was already disintegrating under the pressure of liberation movements of the nations it had oppressed. For example, C. Isopescu-Grecul, announcing on July 22, 1918, a declaration of the "Rumanian parliamentary club" of Bukovynan deputies requesting the Vienna government to protect "the vital interests of Rumanians in Austria", clearly stressed that refusal of protection could lead to disaster, for "Mr. Wilson and the Entente would have handed us over, contrary to our wishes, to the Rumanian Kingdom."³

Thus, at that time Rumanian political figures in Bukovyna did not permit themselves even to think of their land's unification with the Kingdom of Rumania but, on the contrary, voiced their trepidation at such an unwanted alternative. /195/

In late October 1918 H. Hryhorovych, a deputy from Bukovyna, said in the Austrian parliament that "the Rumanians of Bukovyna have no doubt whatsoever that its Ukrainian portion (of Bukovyna — Ed.) should belong to Ukraine and the Rumanian part to Rumania."⁴ At that time not one political figures in Bukovyna's Rumanian community laid claim to the northern part of the region populated mainly by Ukrainians.

Late October 1918, however, witnessed a dramatic speed-up of activity among advocates of the slogan of "Greater Rumania." For example, the Suceava newspaper Veata None denounced on October 27, 1918, the "national council" in Vienna which suggested dividing Bukovyna along ethnic lines. "As to Bukovyna," the newspaper wrote, "its seems to us that our deputies have been too hasty in accepting its dismemberment... Historically and geographically, Bukovyna is indivisible. This is a purely Rumanian territory not only from Suceava to the Prut but also from Vatra-Dornei to the Dnister."⁵ A similar position was also held by the Rumanian* newspaper Glasul Bucovinei which wrote on October 25, 1918, "We do not recognize any rights of the Ukrainians to any part of Bukovyna as a Ukrainian land and call upon all Rumanians... to resist... to the alienation of our ancient land."⁶

Simultaneously with this ideological campaign among the population, ruling circles in the Kingdom of Rumania, aided by pro-Bucharest Bukovynan political figures led by J. Flondor, tried to create at least a semblance of "legal foundations" for handing the whole Bukovyna over to Rumania. It was decided to form a new "national council" in Chernivtsi as a counterweight to the one in Vienna. On October 27, 1918, a Bucharest-inspired "constituent assembly" passed a resolution on the creation of the "Rumanian national council" and "unification of all Bukovyna with other Rumanian lands to form a nation state."⁷

The haste with which this "constituent assembly" was carried out was dictated by the urgent need to obtain from /196/ the mock "representative body" a formal pretext for Rumanian intervention. On November 11, 1918, the Rumanian army entered Northern Bukovyna. Martial law was imposed the following day. N. Iorga explained the emergency measures by the fact that "things were tilting in favor of the Ukrainians."⁸

The Rumanian government and Flondor's entourage worked to juridically formulate an act "unification." For this purpose, the "Committee of Bukovynan Emigres" was relocated on November 23, 1918, by the Rumanian government from Jassy to Chernivtsi. The whole "committee of émigrés" composed of 54 persons with I. Nistor at the head was at once co-opted by the "Rumanian national council" at an extraordinary session on November 25. After the co-optation, the "national council" passed a resolution to convene in three days a "Congress of the Bukovynan people" which would proclaim the "unification" of Bukovyna with Rumania in a legally acceptable form ⁹.

The entry of the Rumanian army into Northern Bukovyna postponed for twenty-two years the fulfillment of the will of the land's Ukrainian population expressed on November 3, 1918, at the Bukovynan people's assembly in Chernivtsi.

The ZUNR (West Ukrainian People's Republic) government protested to Rumania over the occupation of Northern Bukovyna, but it failed to help the Bukovynans, for the West Ukrainian state was already having to defend itself from Polish armed forces. The government of the Ukrainian Hetmanate was in its death throes and lacked any real military force to defend the territory it had.¹⁰ Simultaneously, neither the Ukrainian SSR nor the USSR ever recognized the Rumanian annexation.

2. "Rumania for Rumanians" and Ethnically Ukrainian Territories

To integrate the occupied lands, an administrative unification law was adopted in the interwar period. /197/ Representatives of the occupation authorities tried to prove that "Bessarabia and Bukovyna are artificial entities of Austrian and Russian origin... They have no right at all to exist in Rumania."¹¹ 10 cynuts (provinces) supplanted such historic entities as Moldavia, Bessarabia, Bukovyna, Wallachia, and Transylvania.

The main direction of Rumania's ethnic policy was the Rumanianization of Ukrainians and other ethnic minorities. As soon as in the academic year 1926/27, there remained not a single Ukrainian primary school in Bukovyna; all had been Rumanianized. The law on public education demanded that citizens of "Rumanian origin" who had "forgotten" their native language send their children to state or private schools where Rumanian was the sole language of instruction.¹² Ukrainians were forced adopt Rumanian surnames. The very word "Ukrainian" was prohibited in the early 1930s.¹³.

Rumanian's rapid drift toward fascism greatly intensified discrimination against the Ukrainian population. In the early 1930s leaders of the National Caranist Party put forward the slogan "Rumania for Rumanians." Rabidly chauvinist propaganda was accompanied by punitive measures in order to impose all things Rumanian. The law "On the Protection of National Labor" (1938) demanded ousting of the native population by the Rumanian element not only from state offices but also from private enterprises.¹⁴

Efforts to assimilate the indigenous population were carried out by means of economic, political, ideological, cultural, and educational discrimination against Ukrainians and other national minorities. By pursuing a consistent policy of Rumanianizing the national minorities, Rumania's ruling elite attempted to demonstrate the irreversibility of their ownership of the Ukrainian-inhabited regions of northern Bukovyna and southern Bessarabia.

The onslaught of reaction and fascism in Rumania was accompanied in the 1930s by assertive foreign policy maneuvers. Joining the fascist bloc was regarded by the Rumanian government as a guarantee against Horthy's claims to /198/ Transylvania and a reliable method of preserving its rule over the seized (1918) Ukrainian lands and invading new territories. For instance, in a speech made in late November 1938, Prime Minister of Rumania M. Cristea was unequivocally encroaching on the Transdnistrian lands, i.e., he favored the annexation of the Autonomous Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (basically today's Russian-held Transdnistrian Republic — Eds.) which was then part of the Ukrainian SSR.¹⁵

Rumania's policies, its rapid rapprochement with Nazi Germany posed a threat to the security of the USSR's southwestern borders. At the same time, Moscow was exploring the possibilities of solving the territorial problem. The August 23, 1939, Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact and September 28 Boundary and Friendship Treaty isolated Rumania de facto and gave the USSR carte blanche. On June 26, 1940, the Soviet Union delivered a note to the government of Rumania stressing, among other things, that the question of returning Bessarabia was organically connected with that of handing over to the Soviet Union the part of Bukovyna mostly populated by people tied up with Soviet Ukraine both by "a common historical destiny and a common language and ethnic composition."¹⁶.

On June 27, at the session of the Royal Council which debated the Soviet note of June 26, the Soviet demands were opposed by King Carol II and three others, while the rest of the Council insisted on accepting the offered conditions, which was brought to Soviet government notice. On June 28 Soviet troops entered Northern Bukovyna handed over together with Bessarabia by Rumania.¹⁷

3. Bucharest's Wartime Geopolitical Projects and Ukraine

In the conditions of on-going world war the disengagement of the Rumanian and Ukrainian lands could not be final Plans for renewed expansion were quite popular in Bucharest and encouraged bv Berlin. Rumania, forced to /199/ hand over a part of Transylvania to Horthy's Hungary as per the Vienna Protocol of August 30, 1940, received at the same time Hitler's unambiguous promise of compensation at the expense of Ukraine.

The establishment of a military fascist dictatorship by Antonescu speeded up Rumania's joining the Axis. On November 23, 1940, the government of Rumania signed the Tripartite Pact. All questions of joint actions against the USSR were coordinated between Hitler and Antonescu before May 1941. Rumania was promised Bessarabia, Northern Bukovyna, and Southern Ukraine in case of victory.

An essential role in working out the geopolitical concepts of Rumania's ruling circles on the eve of World War II was played by such works of I. Nistor as "Rumanians beyond the Dnister," "Transdnistrian Rumanians," and "Ancient Rumanian Settlements on the Dnister's Far Bank,"¹⁸ aimed at winning over public opinion to the invasion of those lands. In July 1942 Nistor delivered a paper, "The Geopolitical and Cultural Aspects in Transdnistria" full of delight over the fact that "the latest political events, in a close organic connection with on-going military actions, have brought about a new situation beyond the Dnister," that Nazi Germany and Kingdom of Rumania "have achieved a concrete territorial disengagement and supported the creation of a new Rumanian province known as Transdnistria," while "the administration of Transdnistria can rest on the age-old ethnic, political, and cultural foundations" of this land.¹⁹

Military gains in the war's early stage brought forth still more claims to Ukrainian lands. The newspaper Unirea demanded Rumania extend its border "to the Dnipro or beyond." When German and Rumanian troops reached the Volga, the Bucharest daily Curentul wrote that the border of Rumania should go... along the Urals and thus create a "Rumanian empire as far as the gateway to Asia."²⁰ Various pseudoscientific geopolitical and historical theories were resorted to. G. Bretianu, for example, put forward the thesis /200/ of Rumania's need for a so-called "safety space" of the Rumanian state which in fact repeated the Lebensraum idea of German Nazism.

The Rumanian fascists relied for the practical help on the Nazis in invading foreign lands, including the Ukrainian ones. German military defeat not only thwarted the Rumania's plans for invasions, but also led to the precipitous fall of the fascist regime in Rumania itself.

4. "National Patriotism" as a Method of Assimilating Ethnic Minorities

The postwar settlement fixed the Soviet-Rumanian border as of January 1, 1941. Its Bukovynan portion as well as an area in the Danube mouth corresponded, as a whole, to historical realities and the ethnic composition of the population. Yet, tens of thousands of Ukrainians remained as an ethnic minority in Rumania.

The coming to power of a Communist-led national democratic government effected essential changes in the Soviet-Rumanian relations. Ukraine was not a subject. The theory of "proletarian internationalism" became Rumania's official doctrine in the practice of international relations and the nationalities question.

The first postwar years witnessed certain steps towards revising the concept of the national territorial identity of Northern Bukovyna and Bessarabia. The works of such Rumanian historians as Academician M. Roller, C. Cusnir-Mihailovici, P. Constantinescu-Iasi, V. Liveanu et al. noted that the Kingdom of Rumania, "taking advantage of the hard conditions in the young Soviet republic," had "occupied" Bessarabia and Northern Bukovyna, admitting that "the Ukrainian peasants of Northern Bukovyna had offered resistance to Rumanian occupiers."²¹

The ethnic policy of the Rumanian Communist Party was rather contradictory. Much was done in Rumania in the late 1940s and fifties to revive the ethnic minorities, develop /201/ their languages, and promote their cultures. Ukrainian schools were opened in almost all villages and cities with the Ukrainian population, there were two- pedagogical colleges training teachers for the Ukrainian schools. In 1952 a Ukrainian section was established in the Philology Department of Bucharest University. This period saw an upsurge of cultural activity, the birth of Ukrainian literature mostly among the young intellectuals. A certain contribution in this was made by the Ukrainian-language bi-weekly Novy Vik published since May 1949. The 1940s and fifties saw the publishing in Rumania of Ukrainian-language manuals, fiction, and sociopolitical literature. Ukrainian clubs and libraries were opened in Ukrainian-populated areas. The former had at their disposal choirs, drama societies and other local-talent units which also enjoyed popularity among the Rumanian population. Ukrainian fiction began to develop. The works of poets O. Melnychuk, I. Shmulyak, G. Klempush, V. Borshay, and Y. Pavlysh along with those of prose writers I. Fedko, S. Yatsentyuk, K. Regush, and others are well-known in and outside Rumania. At the same time, Rumania's Serbian minority was subjected to terror and repressions.

When the so-called "independent political line" was formed, the positions in the ethnic question and international relations enshrined earlier in Communist Party documents began to be revised.

In May 1966 Nicolae Ceausescu, making a report dedicated to the forty-fifth anniversary of founding the Rumanian Communist Party, criticized the definition of Rumania as a multinational country and put forward a thesis of its being "unitary nation state."²²

These guidelines were widely covered in the historical and sociopolitical literature published in Rumania thereafter. A process of radical revision of Rumanian national history and relations with the neighboring countries took place, ending in official recognition of a "new historical concept" expressed in a retrospective review of Rumania's history in-/202/cluded in the RCP Program. This "retrospective review" clearly expressed the main ideas and theses of the theory of "continuity" of Rumanian history in the Carpathians-Danube basin. This "theory" was aimed at proving the "historical" right of Rumania to the territories of Bessarabia and northern Bukovyna. This concept became the crux of the whole ideological, political, and educational activities of the RCP.

To rally the population around the Rumanian leadership and support the latter's "self-sufficient," "independent" political course, mass political work widely utilized nationalist ideas of Rumanian historiography, including those generated in the interwar and wartime periods.

Ideological work hoped to educate the population in the spirit of "national patriotism" and undoubtedly fostered nationalist sentiments among many Rumanians. However, such nationalism and chauvinism, the purposeful Rumanianization of ethnic minorities, including Ukrainians, relied upon by Ceausescu's totalitarian regime in its domestic and foreign policies, were in fact among the causes of its fall. Rumanian literary critic V. Cristea wrote in late January 1990 in the journal Rominia Literare: "The Ceausescu phenomenon did not have just one distinctive feature, Communism, it also had a different, no less destructively influential trait, i.e., nationalism or, to be more exact, ultra-nationalism, chauvinism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism. To manipulate us, Ceausescu did not play on Communist persuasions which, to be true, did not exist; he played on nationalist prejudices: these, unfortunately, lived on in the hearts of many."²³

5. Current Complications in Rumanian-Ukrainian Relations

The fall of Ceausescu's totalitarian regime and the advent to power in Rumania of democratic forces in December 1989 as well as the proclamation of Ukraine's independence in 1991 brought about fundamental changes in the Ukrainian-Rumanian relations. The Rumanian parliament, gov-/203/ernment, political parties, and public organizations faced the problem of working out a new strategy of bilateral relations.

Rumania recognized independent Ukraine on January 8, 1992, and established diplomatic relations with it on February 1, 1992. Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs T. Melescanu thinks that "Ukraine is Rumania's most important neighbor from the political and economic viewpoint." In an interview to the newspaper Rominul Melescanu stressed, inter alia, that Ukraine "is the largest country bordering on Rumania, a very important market for our country and, last but not least, a country populated by a Rumanian ethnic minority, a country containing territories which used to be part of the Rumanian national state."²⁵ This is why relations with Ukraine are a priority for Rumania. The cooperation of Rumania and Ukraine in the Black Sea basin, one of the areas of tension in Russo-Ukrainian relations, is treated by Rumanian politicians as an important "trump card to be used immediately."

Postcommunist transformations in Rumanian society and politics have not brought about recovery from nationalist intolerance, manifested in territorial claims on Ukraine raised by radical political forces of the neighboring state which regard it as an active factor of struggle for power. Normal development of bilateral relations is hampered by active and biased exploitation in Bucharest's ambiguous official policy of certain historical issues and, above all, the national and territorial status of northern Bukovyna, Hertsaïv region, as well as the former Khotyn, Akerman and Izmail districts of Bessarabia.

Gradually pursuing a policy of "small steps" on Bessarabia and Northern Bukovyna, the Rumanian ruling elites are attempting to integrate these territories first economically and culturally, then politically. The Rumanian press has of late thrown around the idea that UkrainianRumanian borders are supposedly not guaranteed by international treaties and can be thus revised. This is based on the fact that Ukraine was not an independent subject of in-/204/ternational law at the time those treaties were signed and did not take part in signing them. There territorial issues delay the drafting and signing of a bilateral political treaty between Ukraine and Rumania. Negotiations on signing this document have been conducted for several years now, but the two sides have not yet narrowed their differences. Rumania continues to insist on including in the preamble of the Treaty a clause on condemning the political consequences of the secret Protocol of August 23, 1939. Bucharest does not agree to include an article on the renunciation of any territorial claims of the two parties. The Rumanian intentions to revise borders find no support in Europe. Quite symptomatic against this background was Rumania's futile attempt to slow down Ukraine's entry in the Council of Europe.

The question of the territorial status of North Bukovyna, South Bessarabia and the Zmiïny island, and the gathering of historically Rumanian lands to form a "unitary Rumanian state" is high on the agenda of the election platforms of all the programs of practically all Rumanian political parties. The Ukrainian factor plays a complex role in Bucharest's strategy on Moldova.

Ukrainian-Rumanian relations are also marred by the attempts of certain Rumanian political forces and mass media to falsify Ukraine's policy towards its Rumanian ethnic minority. Rumanian national radical circles and print media engage in vicious anti-Ukrainian propaganda. For example, an article, "Troglodyte Khololitry," printed in the newspaper Flacara stressed, in particular, that "the worst attitude in Ukraine has always been towards Rumanians," while, "of all the neighboring countries, Rumania is the object of deepest hostility," that "it is khokhols (a derogatory term for Ukrainians — Eds.) that are guilty of many things, such as harassing the North Bukovyna Rumanians who have their churches ruined, their graves desecrated, their property looted, their school, cultural activities, and press banned."²⁶ There is no scarcity of such materials in the Rumanian press. /205/

In reality, the Rumanian ethnic minority in Ukraine enjoys far more rights than its Ukrainian counterpart in Rumania. Ukraine offers opportunities for the Rumanian population to receive secondary education in their native language, has created conditions for the development of culture and preservation of ethnic traditions, etc.

Yet, in spite of their complicated historical heritage, of existing difficulties and problems, Ukrainian-Rumanian relations have irreversibly entered a phase of pragmatic, mutually beneficial development. The geo-strategic position of both countries and their objective national interests in major strategic matters gradually bring them closer. The deepening of reforms in both countries should form a basis for constructive Rumanian-Ukrainian relations. The desire for rapid integration into European structures also makes imbued Bucharest with realism.

¹ In 1910 his work Moldavian Claims to Pokuttya (I. Nistor, Die moldauische Ansspriche auf Pokutien (Wien, 1910)) was published in Vienna, the book The Rumanians and Ruthenians in Bukovyna (I. Nistor, Romanii si rutenii in Bucovina: Studiu istoric si statistic Bucuresti, 1915) was printed in Bucharest, and 1918 saw the expanded German-language version of this work The National Struggle in Bukovyna (I. Nistor, Der nationale /409/ Kampf in der Bukowina: Mit besonderer Berucksictingung der Rumanen und Ruthenen historisch beleuchtet (Bukarest, 1918)). "During peace negotiations in Paris and elsewhere as well as while drawing the Polish border, the ethnographic map attached to the German edition was the basic source of information for negotiating and substantiating our rights to the whole Bukovyna." V. Grecu, "Ion I. Nistor ca istoric," Omagiu tui Ion I. Nistor: 19191937, p. 30.

² I. Nistor, Unirea Bucovinei: Studiu si documente (Bucuresti, 1928), p. 15.

³ Quoted from Failure of Bourgeois and Nationalist Falsifications of the History of Soviet Bukovyna (Kyiv, 1987), p. 84.

⁴ Viata noua, 1918, 3 noiem.

⁵ Viata noua, 1918, 27 oct.

⁶ Glasul Bucovinei, 1918, 25 oct.

⁷ I. Nistor, Unirea Bucovinei: Studiu si documente, p. 37.

⁸ I. Iorga, Istoria romanilor, Vol.10, p. 424.

⁹ However, the analysis of the "General Congress" proceedings shows that it was not an elected body and not authorized to seal the fate of Northern Bukovyna. See I. Nistor, Unirea Bucovinei: Studiu si documente, p. 169.

¹⁰ V.M. Botushansky, The Participation of Bukovynan Ukrainians in Ukrainian State-Building," The People's Assembly of Bukovyna. 1918-1933. Proceedings and Documents of the Regional Workshop on the 75th Anniversary of the November 3, 1918, Bukovyna People's Assembly (Chemivtsi, 1944), p. 59.

¹¹ Krasnaya Bessarabiya, 1936, № 10, p. 13 (in Russian).

¹² Monitorul oficial, July 26, 1924.

¹³ V.M. Kurylo, In the Liberation Struggle of 1922-1940 (Lviv, 1977), p. 48.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 49-50.

¹⁵ See N.I. Lebedev, The Collapse of Fascism in Rumania (Moscow, 1976: in Russian), p. 208.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 265.

¹⁷ Essays in the Political History of Rumania (1859-1944) (Kishinev, 1985: in Russian), pp. 384-386. Since the transfer of Northern Bukovyna was not preceded by a unilateral action of the Soviet Union but by a bilateral exchange of notes, and the Soviet side "enabled the Rumanian statesmen to freely express their will, all talk about a "probable annexation is superfluous," stresses a West German international law expert H. Weber in his study "Bukovyna in World War Two" (Cf. H. Weber, "Bukowina in Zweiten Weltkrieg," Volkerrechtliche Aspects der Lage der Bukowina im Spannungsfeld zwischen Rumannien, Sowietunion und Deutschland (Berlin, 1972.). The International Law Aspects of the Bukovynan Situation." From the international law viewpoint, the definition of "occupation" can only be applied to Northern Bukovyna before the invasion of its territory by the Rumanian troops both in 1918 and 1941, proves Weber convincingly. See H. Weber, Op. cit., pp.9, 14.

¹⁸ I. Nistor, Romanii de peste Nistru: Lamurire pentru a-i ojuta in lupta.; Nistor I. Romanii Transnistreni (Cernauti, 1925). I. Nistor, "Vechi-/410/ mea asezarilor romanesti dincolo de Nistru," Anal. Acad. Rom., Ser. III, 1932, T.12.

¹⁹ I. Nistor, "Aspectele geopolitice si culturale din Transnistria," Anal. Acad. Rom., Ser. III, 1942, T. 25, pp. 32, 47.

²⁰ N. I. Lebedev, Op. cit., p. 356.

²¹ M. Roller, Problem: de istorie (Bucuresti, 1951); C. Cusnir-Mihailovici, Despre situatia revolutionara din Romania in perioada 1918 — 1920 (Bucuresti, 1955); P. Constantinescu-Iasi, Influenta Marii Revolutii Socialiste din Octombre asupra miscarii revolutionare din Romania (Bucuresti, 1957); V. Liveanu, 1918 Din istoria luptelor revoluttonare din Romania (Bucuresti, 1960).

²² N. Ceausescu, Rumania in the Final Stretch of Socialist Construction (Bucharest, 1969: in Russian), I, p. 403.

²³ Quoted from Za rubezhom, 1990, № 14, March 30 — April 5, p. 4 (in Russian), p. 4.

²⁴ T. Melescanu, "Romania a trecut din tabara candidatilor la integrarea euro-atlantica, in tabara potentialilor membri ai acestei aliante," Romanul, December 24, 1994, January 8, 1995, p. 5.

²⁵ This motivation is, of course, out of place, for the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic took pait, along with other allied states, in signing the 1947 peace treaty with Rumania; it has been a UN member since the inception of this international organization.

²⁶ Flacara, 1993, December 8.

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